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Compulsory licensing and access to drugs
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Abstract
Compulsory licensing allows the use of a patented invention without the owners
consent, with the aim of improving access to essential drugs. The pharmaceutical
sector argues that, if broadly used, it can be detrimental for innovation. We model
the interaction between a company in the North, that holds the patent for a certain
drug, and a government in the South that needs to purchase it. We show that both
access to drugs as well as pharmaceutical innovation depend largely on the Southern
countrys ability to manufacture a generic version. If the manufacturing cost is too
high, compulsory licensing is not exercised. As the cost decreases, it becomes a
credible threat forcing prices down, but reducing both access and innovation. When
the cost is low enough, the South produces its own generic version, and access reaches
its highest value, despite a reduction in innovation. The global welfare analysis
shows that the overall impact of compulsory licensing can be positive, even when
accounting for its impact on innovation. We also consider the interaction between
compulsory licensing and the strength of IPRs, which can have global repercussions
in other markets beyond the South.
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1 Introduction
Access to pharmaceutical drugs remains one of the greatest challenges of health policy
around the world. Yet a number of developing countries lack both the manufacturing
capability to develop new drugs as well as the negotiating power to buy them at a¤ordable
prices.
To address the issue, members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) signed in
2001 in Doha the Declaration of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs) which include considerations on public health. The Doha Declaration,
as more commonly known, provided for the rst time a strong negotiating tool to devel-
oping countries by allowing them to issue compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. A
compulsory license is a non-voluntary authorization imposed by a government between
the patent holder and a third party, by which the latter is allowed to use the patented
invention without the patent owners consent. Since the Doha Declaration, compulsory
licensing has been exercised by a number of countries, including Thailand and Brazil.
The pharmaceutical industry argues that, if broadly used, compulsory licensing re-
duces its incentives to innovate (Rozek, 2000; Scherer and Watal, 2002). The interest
of the pharmaceutical sector becomes more apparent in a world with weak protection of
intellectual property rights (IPRs), which may have global repercussions. For instance,
imagine international exhaustion of IPRs such that parallel trade is allowed (Danzon,
1997; Bale, 1998; Bennato and Valletti, 2011; Mantovani and Naghavi, 2012; Guo et
al., 2013), or a system of international reference pricing (Galizzi et al., 2011; Garcia
Mariñoso et al., 2011). In both cases, if a drug becomes cheaper in the country that
exercises a compulsory license, it will a¤ect the rms ability to set di¤erential pricing
in di¤erent countries.
Despite the intense policy debate on compulsory licensing and the role it may play in
improving access to drugs, to the best of our knowledge, there exists no formal treatment
in the health economics literature. The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical
framework that allows the analysis of the impact of compulsory licensing on access to
essential drugs, and the possible long-term impact on pharmaceutical innovation and
on welfare. Our contribution is also original in that we consider explicitly the cost of
distributing the drug to the developing country. Evidence shows that these costs can
be quite substantial (Pecoul et al., 1999; WHO, 2002) and often determine whether a
pharmaceutical product will reach remote rural areas or not (Chaudhuri et al., 2006).
In our analysis, access to drugs depends not only on drug prices but also on the
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number of people that can be reached.1 Our ndings show that the impact of compulsory
licensing on key policy variables, such as R&D investment, access and welfare, rst
decrease and then jump up as compulsory licensing becomes a more credible threat.
We also discuss how our results change when compulsory licensing interacts with other
policy tools that a¤ect the IPRs of the patent holder, in particular under a system of
international exhaustion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews briey a number of motivating
cases where compulsory licensing has been used. Section 3 presents the model and
section 4 develops it. Section 5 considers the interaction between compulsory licensing
and international exhaustion of IPRs. Section 6 discusses the ndings and concludes.
2 Background and motivating cases
2.1 Background
The process of issuing a compulsory license is not undemanding. The TRIPs agreement
(art. 31) states that before applying for a license, the person or company that has an
interest in making use of a patented invention must rst try to negotiate a voluntary
license with the patent owner. If the negotiation fails, then a compulsory license can be
delivered.
The adoption of compulsory licenses is not without cost either. It entails expensive
legal and administrative costs for the government that has called for that exception. In
addition, even when the non-voluntary license has been granted, other costs associated
with its use would arise. These costs are related to reputational losses, sanctions and
retaliation in response to a possible violation of international law.2
2.2 Motivating cases
Since the Doha Declaration in 2001, compulsory licensing has been used in a number of
occasions. One of the most prominent cases comes from Thailand. The Thai Ministry of
Health, with the aim to provide universal health care, has used compulsory licensing to
import generic versions from countries where these drugs are not patented, or make use of
the patented technology to produce it (NHSO, 2007; Steinbrook, 2007). In 2006, the Thai
Ministry of Public Health announced the rst compulsory license for the antiretroviral
1This is why the terms access and coverage are used interchangeably in this paper.
2Countries that do not meet their certain obligations are subject to trade penalties (Kerr and Gaisford,
2007).
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drug Efavirenz, patented by Merck. A few months later, 66,000 bottles of a generic
version were imported from India. By the end of 2007, Thailand announced compulsory
licenses for more than 20 drugs for HIV/AIDS, cardiovascular conditions and cancer.
One of them, Gleevec, for the treatment of cancer, was cancelled later on when the
manufacturing company, Novartis, o¤ered to provide it for free. In 2008, Thailand
produced and delivered a generic version of Abbots Kaletra, a drug for HIV. As a result,
Abbott Laboratories announced they would withdraw their activities from Thailand and
would not introduce any new medicines in the country (Lybecker and Fowler, 2009).
Along the lines of the Thai experience, other countries have followed a similar path,
but obtaining di¤erent results. In August 2001, the Brazilian government announced it
would issue a compulsory license for manufacturing the antiretroviral drug Nelnavir, a
generic version of Viracept by Roche, to a local pharmaceutical producer. Following the
announcement and a series of negotiations, Brazil cancelled the compulsory license after
Roche agreed to sell the drug in Brazil at a 40% discount (Cohen, 2006). In 2007 Brazil
achieved another deep discount on the price of Sustiva, an antiretroviral drug, after
threatening to issue a compulsory license for the use of Mercks patent on it (Cohen,
2007).3 Although the use of discount exposes the monopolist to the risk that these lower
prices may be used as external reference pricing in other markets, it also allows it to
keep up its reputation at the international level, preserving at the same time its market
shares in large markets such as Brazil.4
Rwanda made use of paragraph 6 of Doha Declaration requesting the manufacturing
of Apo TriAvir from Canada. Indeed, in 2007 Canada manufactured and shipped copies
of Apo TriAvir to Rwanda, becoming the rst country to issue a compulsory license
for exporting a generic drug to a third country (Reichman, 2009). Following Canada, a
number of developed countries have also used compulsory licensing not only for exporting
to poorer countries but also to stop anticompetitive actions (Coco and Nebbia, 2007;
van Zimmeren and Requena, 2007). These examples, although of less relevance to our
model, indicate the increasingly wider use of compulsory licensing.5
3For more details on the Brazilian case see, for instance, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/
4 Indonesia, India, Vietnam and South Korea have all threatened Roche with compulsory license for
Tamiu, a commonly used drug for the treatment of u. Roche decided to manufacture the drug with
partners from these four countries (van Zimmeren and Requena, 2007).
5Compulsory licenses are used in a wider variety of cases, in both the patent and copyright areas. In
the U.S., National Public Radio and PBS have a license as non-commercial institutions to play music on
public broadcasting. In the biotech industry, the U.S. government has granted a number of compulsory
licenses on key patents to other biotech and pharmaceutical companies. The U.S. government also uses
compulsory licenses of air-pollution technology to promote clean air, under the Clean Air Act. See
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl for more information and examples.
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2.3 Compulsory licensing and international exhaustion of IPRs
Originally, the TRIPs agreement, with the aim to protect the IPRs of the innovative
rm, regulated an important exception about the international exhaustion of IPRs (art.
31(f)). Products made under compulsory licensing should be manufactured mainly for
domestic use. However, this was weakened in a landmark decision made by the WTO
in 2003: the so-called Paragraph 6 problem allowed the generic copy made under
compulsory licenses to be exported to developing countries that lack production capac-
ity. Indeed, in 2006 the European Parliament intervened in favor of 23 such countries,
allowing the use of parallel trade to address public health problems.6
Since the TRIPs agreement has never dened an unambiguous solution for this prob-
lem, it may be possible to parallel trade those goods manufactured under a non-voluntary
license (Matthews, 2004). As the price of a compulsory licensed drug will be lower than
the price of the equivalent patented drug, there will be an incentive to export the cheaper
drug into more expensive markets. To avoid this arbitrage, the patent holder will then
have to reduce the price also in more expensive markets. Thus, compulsory licensing
can have global e¤ects that go well beyond the national boundaries (Maskus, 2000;
Pecorino, 2002; Danzon and Towse, 2003; Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004; Danzon et al.,
2005; Valletti and Szymanski, 2006; Grossman and Lai, 2008; Morais, 2008).
Parallel trade is only one way of weakening IPRs, which will a¤ect the ability of the
drug manufacturer to sustain international price di¤erences (Goro¤ and Reich, 2010).
Similarly, one could argue that compulsory licensing could have country spillovers via
international reference pricing (Brekke et al., 2007; Miraldo, 2009; Bardey et al., 2010),
insofar as the price in one country a¤ects the price in some other country.7
3 Model assumptions
There are two countries that we denote respectively as the North (N) and the South
(S). In each country, there is a downward-sloping demand for a drug, generated by
preferences à la Mussa and Rosen (1978). Specically, consumers are heterogenous, and
a consumer of type  that buys a drug of product u at a price pi in country i enjoys a
net utility given by:
U() = u  pi;
6http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:157:0001:0007:EN:PDF
7There are many reasons that can weaken the ability of a drug company to adopt di¤erential pricing
globally. Even if parallel trade under compulsory licence is illegal, it does not mean it is not possible,
especially if enforcement is weak. Hornbeck (2005) nds evidence of illegal international smuggling of
expensive AIDS drugs from African countries to the US.
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where  measures the consumers marginal valuation of quality. We account for di¤er-
ences in consumer preferences between the two countries in the following way. In the
North, the taste parameter  is distributed uniformly, with unit density, over the interval
 2 [0; 1]: In the South, the taste parameter  is distributed uniformly, with unit density,
over the interval  2 [0; a], where it is reasonable to assume a  1. Note that a is a
parameter that a¤ects elasticity: the lower is a, the more elastic is demand in the South
compared to the North. In the South, there is a total mass  of potential consumers,
where  7 1, as the South can be more or less populated compared to the North. In
both countries, consumers can also decide not to buy any supplied good, and in this
case they obtain their reservation utility, which is normalized to zero. Since the lowest
type is 0, in both countries there will be always someone who does not buy any product,
unless it is o¤ered for free.8
North and South di¤er in three important respects. First, the good is supplied by
the patent holder who is based in the North. This is the only rm authorized to provide
the patented good, both in the North and in the South market. By spending resources
on R&D, the monopolist can improve the quality of its drug, with the cost of quality,
denoted as C(u); increasing at an increasing rate, C 0(u) > 0 and C 00(u) > 0.9 These
costs are incurred only at the investment stage, while all other costs at the manufacturing
stage are normalized to zero for simplicity.
The second di¤erence between the North and South stems from distribution costs and
access to health services. While the North has a system already in place for distributing,
selling, and administering drugs at any location (full coverage), this does not hold for
the South. In particular, we assume that, when a number x of locations is supplied in
the South, there are some associated additional local costs dened as H(x), increasing
at an increasing rate, H 0(x) > 0 and H 00(x) > 0. To obtain closed-form solutions, we
employ the following function:
H(x) = k
x2
2
;
where k is a parameter that allows us to describe how costly it is to supply the South. In
the North there is a unit mass of customers, while in the South the mass of consumers
8Preferences of this kind have been employed to describe pharmaceutical markets by Wright (2004)
and Valletti and Szymanski (2006), among others, and can also be interpreted as stemming from income
heterogeneity. Notice that we are therefore assuming that there are disparities of income both in the
North and in the South. We avoid any reference to co-payment mechanisms, as these preferences are
simply meant to generate downward demands in both countries: if the price of a drug decreases, more
people will have access to it (either by paying in part, or by having a health provider paying for it).
Similarly, if the quality of a drug increases, ceteris paribus, there is a demand expansion e¤ect.
9As it will become apparent below, the parameter restriction k
a42
> 1
16C00
is needed for the second-
order condition w.r.t. u to be always satised.
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served varies in equilibrium with k. Hence the role of k is also to take into account
di¤erences in the market size of the North relative to the South: a small value of k
corresponds to a large South relative to the North, and vice versa. In other words, to
supply and administer drugs to more people in the South becomes progressively more
expensive, as this involves the supply to the least accessible patients.10
In each market, there is thus a marginal type who is just indi¤erent between buying
and not buying, dened as
 i = pi=u;
where i = N;S: For future reference, it is convenient to dene consumer surplus in both
countries, which is respectively
CSN =
Z 1
N
(u  pN )d =
(u  pN )
2
2u
;
CSS = x
Z a
S
(u  pS)d = x
(au  pS)
2
2u
: (1)
The third di¤erence concerns the role of governments. We assume that the govern-
ment in the North does not regulate any aspect of drug production and consumption.
The North has adopted a strong regime of IPR that grants a patent to the monopolist for
reasons that we do not model, but just take as given. In contrast, the South government
can recur to compulsory licensing in the way we specify below. Cross-national drug price
di¤erentials may therefore be based not only on demand elasticity, but on di¤erences
between the interference of national governments by way of regulation of drug prices
(Maskus, 2000; Pecorino, 2002; Jelovac and Bordoy, 2005). The strategic players in our
model are the monopolist rm and the South government.
3.1 Compulsory licensing regime
We consider the following timing (see Figure 1). First, the monopolist decides on its
R&D e¤ort. In the second stage, the rm proposes a price pS to the South government.
If the o¤er is accepted, in the last stage the rm decides on the coverage x of the market
10One interpretation is the following. Imagine that, in the South, there is a certain mass of potential
consumers who live in di¤erent locations, which are ordered according to a distance parameter x: This
represents how easy or di¢cult it is to supply and market drugs at that location (e.g., geographic access).
Consumers at x = 0 are those in the biggest city, where it is very easy to supply them (e.g., because
basic services are already in place), while to reach, supply and administer drugs to more people in remote
regions becomes progressively more expensive for the provider. The model will determine endogenously
the equilibrium value of x, i.e., the coverage of those locations where people might have access to the
drug.
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Figure 1: Sequence of moves under compulsory licensing when parallel trade is banned
in the South, and simultaneously sets the price pN in the North. If the o¤er is not
accepted, the government of the South can resort to compulsory licensing, and the rm
still sets the price of the patented good in the North. The use of compulsory licensing
implies that the government of the South has the ability to serve domestic consumers
(i.e., by choosing x) at the same production cost as the monopolist (here, normalized to
zero), but it incurs a positive xed cost F .
In other words, the issuing of compulsory licensing gives autonomy to the South, but
comes at a cost (i.e., legal, administrative and reputational costs). The idea is that it
would be cheaper for the South to regulate the price of the drug than to engage in a
complicated WTO procedure for the license. Also, it is cheaper to produce the existing
drug in the North than to have it licensed by the South, as marginal cost is the same
in both regions, but there is no xed cost (of compulsory licensing) in the North. As
such, compulsory licensing is not e¢ciency-enhancing per se. The xed cost F could
also be reinterpreted as the loss in consumer surplus to the South when producing the
drug itself, but with an inferior quality to that of the original patent holder.
We develop our analysis assuming a regime in which North and South are completely
separate, i.e. parallel trade is banned. However, as argued in Section 2.3, parallel trade
may be possible and therefore, in section 5, we will also consider the case where parallel
trade is applicable to drugs manufactured under compulsory licensing.
4 Analysis
In order to set a benchmark, we start by characterizing the unregulated equilibrium when
compulsory licensing is ruled out. Both in the domestic and in the foreign market, the
patent holder behaves as a monopolist. After R&D investment is sunk, the monopolist
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sets a price pN in the North and a price pS in the South to maximize its prots
N + S =
Z 1
N
pNd + x
Z a
S
pSd  H(x)
= pN (1  pN=u) + pS(a  pS=u)x   kx
2=2:
It follows immediately that optimal prices are set as follows
pN = p

N =
u
2
;
pS = p

S =
au
2
:
Prots di¤er in each country also due to coverage di¤erences. Indeed, in the North
the monopolist makes a prot equal to N =
u
4 and in the South its prots are S =
a2u
4 x  k
x2
2 : The optimal coverage of the South is also immediately derived and equal
to
x =
ua2
4k
; (2)
which is increasing in quality (u), as gross prots at each location also increase in quality,
as well as in the willingness to pay (a), and in the potential population () of the South.
When choosing R&D, the patent holder maximizes its global prots
 = N + S   C(u) =
u
4
+
u2a42
32k
  C(u):
The monopolist thus o¤ers both in the North and in the South a good having the same
optimal quality u, implicitly dened by
1
4
+
ua42
16k
= C
0
(u): (3)
The resulting coverage follows from (2), with x = ua2=(4k).
It is also useful to dene what would happen if the monopolist completely ignored
the South, obtaining prots only in the North (autarky). In this case, quality would be
uN < u, dened by 1=4 = C
0
(uN ).
Compulsory licensing (CL) Imagine rst that the South accepts the o¤er pS of the
monopolist. As R&D costs are sunk at this stage, coverage in the South is still decided
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by the monopolist from maximizing S = pS(a  pS=u)x  kx
2=2; that gives
x = pS
au  pS
ku
; (4)
which, from (1), ensures a welfare in the South which coincides with its consumer surplus
CSS =
(au  pS)
3pS
2ku2
2; (5)
since there is yet no compulsory licensing, and F is therefore not spent. Notice that this
expression is maximized for 0 < pS = au=4 < p

S , trading o¤ between cheaper prices and
the monopolist incentive to supply coverage.
Instead, the South government could opt for a non-voluntary license, and pay the
corresponding costs. Under the compulsory licensing regime, in the last stage of the
game the South government optimally sets the price of the drug to zero (the marginal
production cost), and also sets the market coverage to maximize welfare
WS = x
Z a
S
(u)d   k
x2
2
  F;
which is the consumer surplus in the South minus the coverage costs and the xed cost.
Since S = 0, it follows that the optimal coverage is
x =
ua2
2k
;
which identies the welfare of the South achievable under compulsory licensing as
WCLS =
u2a42
8k
  F: (6)
Comparing (6) and (5), if Fk
2
< a
4u2
8  
(au pS)
3pS
2u2
the o¤er is rejected and compulsory
licensing is preferred, otherwise the government of the South accepts the o¤er made by
the monopolist. To conclude the characterization of the third stage, the price in the
North is always set at pN = p

N = u=2.
In the second stage, the monopolist makes its take-or-leave-it o¤er, subject to the
foreign governments ability to recur to compulsory licensing. If the o¤er is rejected,
the monopolists prots are zero in the South, and N = u=4 in the North. If accepted,
prots are still N = u=4 in the North, and S =
[pS(a pS=u)]
2
2k in the South.
We can easily establish some limiting cases. First, if the monopolist was uncon-
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strained, the prots in the South would be maximized for pS = p

S = u=2, from which
it follows a consumer surplus of CSS = u
2a42=32k for the South. This value is better
than the welfare under the outside option (i.e., making use of the compulsory licensing)
if F is high enough, and therefore the o¤er is always accepted in this range of values of
F . Second, if the monopolist acted in the best interest of the South maximizing CSS
from (5) instead of its prots, we established that it would o¤er a price ps = au=4. At
this price, the corresponding consumer surplus is CSS = 27u
2a42=512k, which is worse
than the welfare of the South under the outside option if F is low enough, hence any
o¤er would be rejected in this range of values of F . Third, for intermediate values of F ,
the price pS comes from the binding outside option, CSS =W
CL
S .
Consequently, the optimal solution takes the following form
pS(u) =
8><
>:
au
2 if
Fk
a42
> u
2
8  
u2
32 =
3u2
32 ;
(au pS)
3pS
2
2ku2
= u
2a42
8k   F if
37u2
512 
Fk
a42
 3u
2
32 ;
o¤er rejected if Fk
a42
< u
2
8  
27u2
512 =
37u2
512 :
(7)
Moving back to the rst stage, the monopolist chooses the level of investment in
R&D looking ahead and anticipating the strategy chosen by the foreign government. Its
maximization problem amounts to
max
u
(u; pS(u)) = N + S   C(u); (8)
where N = u=4 and the value of S depends on the value taken by the xed cost, as
expressed by (7). We are now in a position to prove our rst result.11
Proposition 1 (i) When Fk=(a42)  3(u)2=32, compulsory licensing (CL) is not a
credible threat and the equilibrium is the same as in the benchmark: uCL = u, pCLS = p

S,
xCL = x. (ii) When L < Fk=(a42) < 3(u)2=32, with L < 37(uN )2=512, CL is a
credible threat but the South is still supplied by the monopolist: uCL < u, uCL=4 <
pCLS < p

S, x
CL < x, where uCL < uN when Fk approaches L. (iii) When Fk=(a42) 
L, CL is exercised along the equilibrium path: uCL = uN , pCLS = 0, x
CL > xN , where
also xCL > x if k is large enough.
We comment on our ndings also with the help of Figure 2, where the curves in
bold depict the equilibrium as a function of the cost of compulsory licensing.12 The top
11All proofs are in the Appendix, where also the expressions for L are provided.
12 In Figure 2, we use a quadratic cost function C(u) = u2=2, and set k = 1; a = 1;  = 1. While we
frame the discussion in terms of F , one could similarly refer, e.g., to the equilibrium size of the South
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and middle panels describe respectively the invested quality, and coverage in the South.
Starting from the right with high values of F (region (iii)), obviously, the recourse to
a compulsory license is useless due to its high costs, thus the monopolist still asks for
the unconstrained monopoly price, and we fall back to the unregulated benchmark. The
more interesting cases arise for intermediate and low xed costs, which make compulsory
licensing a credible threat. We emphasize how both investment and coverage are non-
monotonic with respect to F : starting from high levels of F , a better outside option (via
a lower value of F ) leads rst to a decrease both in u and x. As F is further decreased,
they both increase when the South government starts manufacturing via the compulsory
license, and in fact x can even become higher than the benchmark.
For intermediate values of F (region (ii)), despite the low bargaining power of the
foreign government, a compulsory licensing regime implies that the monopolist cannot
act in an unconstrained manner and, to avoid a rejection, it has to take into account the
welfare of the South when making an o¤er. Compulsory licensing is a credible threat but
it is not played along the equilibrium path: it simply causes the rm to o¤er its drug at a
cheaper price in the South. This price cut directly reduces both the incentives to invest
in R&D, causing u to decrease, as well as diminished incentives to supply coverage x.
In this intermediate range, the South government benets in aggregate from compulsory
licensing compared to the benchmark, since it is able to obtain a better price. We
emphasize, however, that this improvement for the South comes essentially from a price
e¤ect: conditional on being supplied, more people can a¤ord the drug; however the rm
is less motivated to supply coverage precisely because of the cheaper drug price, so that
fewer remote areas end up being covered.
For lower values of F , the monopolist, when choosing its R&D investment, would
not make any prots in the South, if the South recurs to compulsory licensing. Instead
of losing the South market entirely, the monopolist prefers to expand the intermediate
region (ii) where the outside option just binds: it does so by actually o¤ering fairly low
levels of u which can be matched by a small increase in the price pS : The monopolist
goes even below the level uN it would choose if it simply made monopoly prots only in
the North market, and zero in the South (autarky). This is not a paradoxical result but
comes from the fact that an increase in quality improves the outside option (6) relatively
more than CSS as given by (5). By providing a low quality, the monopolist is not forced
to o¤er a big price reduction, and nonetheless have this price accepted by the South.
The monopolist thus stretches the validity of the intermediate region (ii) in order to
relative to the North, as described by k, after having xed a value for the other parameters. What
matters to distinguish the three regions of Proposition 1 is in fact simply the term Fk=(a42).
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still have some sales in the South, until it nds it optimal to give up the South market
entirely.
When F is very low (region (i)), the outside option is now taken in equilibrium. The
foreign government acts independently and is able to supply the unbranded good to a
large part of its population, reaching also rural areas which the unregulated monopolist
is not willing to cover. This is when there is an upward jump in x. The market
coverage of the South can even be larger than x in the unregulated (unconstrained)
benchmark: this is certainly the case in Figure 2. As we show in the proof, this is
always true, more in general, for high enough values of k.13 This explains a fundamental
di¤erence between relatively small countries and larger ones. For very large countries
(low values of k), even if compulsory licensing is relatively cheap (low values of F ), the
ability to improve access to drugs will be severely undermined by the reduction in the
quality of the drug, as the large South country has a big impact on the global prots of
the drug manufacturer. Lower quality reduces willingness to pay and coverage. Instead,
if the South is small relatively to the North (large k), but still has the ability to recur to
compulsory licensing, its impact on global investment is negligible, and will benet from
the ability of basing access to drugs according to national welfare, instead of having to
rely on private supply and delivery.
Before turning to the welfare analysis of compulsory licensing, we briey discuss some
of our assumptions and their implications. First, when the South government recurs
to compulsory licensing, it sets the welfare maximizing price of the drug to zero. This
assumes that the South government can fund the coverage costs with no other distortions,
i.e., from international donations or from non-distortionary taxation. Alternatively, one
could posit that the South government does not have such funds, and hence has to break
even overall. The main thrust of the results would go through also under this alternative
specication, which would however reduce the range of values of F such that compulsory
licensing results in a credible threat. Analytically, expressions would be more complex.14
Second, a key role is played by our assumption that the monopolist can make a take-
it-or-leave-it o¤er only based on price, but not on coverage. When the o¤er is rejected,
the South government can decide on the coverage itself. It is this assumption that,
when F is low enough, makes the South reject any o¤er and act on its own. If instead
one postulated that the monopolist could make contractible o¤ers based both on price
13Under a quadratic cost function C(u) = u
2
2
, it is u = 4k
16k a42
and uN = 1
4
: Hence xCL = u
Na2
2k
>
x = u
a2
4k
for all values k > a
42
8
:
14 Instead of (6), the value of the outside option would now be WCLS =
2(a2u2 p2
S
)2
8ku2
  F; where pS is
the solution to the break-even condition in the South 
2(au pS)
2(3pS au)(pS+au)
8ku2
  F = 0:
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and coverage, then clearly the monopolist could match any outside option of the South
(because the monopolist saves F ), and compulsory licensing would never occur along the
equilibrium path. Our assumption is justiable insofar as the contract between the rm
and the South government is incomplete, because some aspects of the delivery contract
are uncertain and cannot be fully contracted upon.
4.1 Welfare analysis
In the previous sections we examined the impact of compulsory licensing separately on
access to drugs and pharmaceutical innovation. We now take a look at the overall welfare
e¤ects of compulsory licensing.
Welfare is the sum of consumer surplus in both countries and the rms prot. This
is a standard notion of welfare that is particularly appropriate in our context where R&D
happens in the North, while CL might be exercised in the South. In case compulsory
licensing is exercised, also the additional costs of manufacturing in the South have to be
accounted for. Hence, in regions (ii) and (iii) welfare is
W = CSN + CSS +
=
u
2

1 
pN
u
2
+ x

a 
pS
u
2
  C(u) H(x): (9)
In region (iii) instead it is
WCL = CSN + CSS +  F: (10)
By making use of the bottom panel of Figure 2, we assess welfare against the ab-
sence of compulsory case, in which case the benchmark arises (region (i) would apply
everywhere). By allowing compulsory licensing, as the cost of manufacturing for the
South goes down in region (ii), so does the overall welfare e¤ect. This is due to the
fact the monopolists prots are reduced since it cannot act in an unconstrained manner
anymore, lowering consequently its coverage and investment. Consumer surplus is also
lowered overall (consumers in the South, in particular, get a cheaper drug, but they also
get a lower-quality drug, which is supplied to fewer areas). While compulsory licensing
does not emerge along the equilibrium path, it does have real e¤ects as it changes the
monopolists behavior.
However, when F gets low then welfare can increase with compulsory licensing, even
signicantly, reaching levels higher than in the benchmark case. There are three forces
at work in region (iii). The positive e¤ect on welfare is due to the better access that the
13
South achieves. This has to be contrasted with the ine¢ciencies due to manufacturing
in the South (F ), though these will be low in region (iii), as well as with the reduction
in R&D. The overall welfare e¤ect will then possibly depend on the relative size of the
countries. While we do not want to claim absolute generality, the next result shows that
the example of Figure 2 is not special, in that it extends to all values of k=(a42).
Proposition 2 Imagine C(u) = u
2
2 . When compulsory licensing is exercised (region
(iii)) it always improves global welfare compared to a regime that did not allow it.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
5 Robustness check: International exhaustion of IPRs
We now consider how compulsory licensing might interact with other aspects of inter-
national trade regulations. We study the consequences of the spillover e¤ect that the
drug price in the South might have in the North. The channel (and policy tool) that
we examine is an international exhaustion regime making parallel trade legal, although
our results can also be interpreted as any weakening of IPRs such that the price in the
South will have an impact on the price set in the North. We stress again that the TRIPs
agreement does not make the issue of compulsory licensing and parallel trade very clear.
Although the use of compulsory licensing represents one of the exibilities recognized by
TRIPs, the same rules establish that all goods yielded under compulsory licensing should
be conned to the country that has called for a compulsory license. However, exceptions
are permitted, which makes the emergence of grey markets a real possibility.
With this regard, extending our analysis to the parallel trade case, we assume that,
when the government of the South does not accept the monopolists o¤er and recurs
instead to compulsory licensing, two scenarios are possible. In the rst case of restricted
parallel trade, the government of the South making use of the compulsory licensing aims
at serving the domestic market only, hence, pN 6= pS . In the second case of unrestricted
parallel trade, exceptions are in force and the goods manufactured under compulsory
licensing are allowed to be parallel traded.
If parallel trade is permitted, arbitrage is perfect and reimportation costs do not
exist (e.g., re-packaging and transport costs are zero). The rm is therefore forced to
set a uniform price both in the North and in the South market, pN = pS , as it would
otherwise attract arbitrageurs.15
15This is a standard assumption in the literature on parallel trade. It is easy to accommodate imperfect
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In order to make the analysis sharper, we now set the highest willingness to pay a = 1
also in the South. Under this assumption, without CL, prices would be pN = pS = p
 =
u
2 both in the North and in South. Hence there would be no arbitrage possibilities.
Parallel trade can thus have a role only under CL. In other words, this simplication
is conceptually useful as it eliminates other confounding factors that have already been
examined in the literature, and do not need to be repeated here. To further simplify
calculations, we now also set  = 1, but this is immaterial for the results that follow.
Under these assumptions, we can extend our previous analysis. As before, if Fk <
u2
8  
(u pS)
3pS
2u2
the o¤er is rejected and compulsory licensing is preferred. If Fk >
u2
8  
(u pS)
3pS
2u2
, the government of the South accepts the monopolists o¤er. Thus the
optimal price schedule still takes the same form as (7).
In the rst stage, the monopolist chooses the level of R&D to maximize (8), where
now the expressions of both S and N depend on the value taken by the xed cost and
by the particular regime of parallel trade.
Proposition 3 (i) When Fk  3(u)2=32, parallel trade is irrelevant. (ii) When eL <
Fk < 3(u)2=32, with L < eL, the South is still supplied by the monopolist and parallel
trade reduces investment, despite increasing the price in the South: euCL < uCL < u,
u=4 < pCL < epCL < p. (iii) When Fk  eL, parallel trade is irrelevant if it is restricted,
otherwise it further reduces investment.
Figure 2 is again helpful to discuss the results, where the dotted curves, when rel-
evant, refer to parallel trade. For intermediate values of F (region (ii)), the outside
option binds but the monopolist still supplies the good to the South. Because there is
no recourse to compulsory licensing, there is no di¤erence between a situation of un-
restricted or restricted parallel trade, since in both cases there is a uniform price
everywhere as the good is supplied by the monopolist. Parallel trade, by reducing the
monopolists global prots, reduces investment in u compared to the absence of parallel
trade. The e¤ect of parallel trade on coverage x in this intermediate region is generally
ambiguous: while parallel trade reduces quality, which should also reduce coverage in
equilibrium, there is a countervailing force from the price e¤ect: parallel trade results
in higher prices in the South, which tends to increase coverage. In Figure 2, the former
prevails in the right part of region (ii), but not in the left part.
The di¤erence between unrestricted and restricted parallel trade arises and is
stark when Fk < eL. The unrestricted regime extends the validity of region (ii) where
arbitrage in the model, e.g., by having unit tranportation costs t for parallel traders. In this case, if t is
not large, pN = pS + t:
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the monopolist still supplies the South to very low values of F : the rm prefers to always
sell to the South in order to avoid the risk of triggering a compulsory license, which would
then imply reimportation at a zero price. The restricted regime instead protects IPRs
more, and region (iii) emerges, as in the case without parallel trade. Actually, region
(iii) is now larger, i.e., it occurs for a wider range of values of Fk.16
When there is a prohibition of re-importation (restricted regime), parallel trade
has no e¤ect on either u or x for low F in region (iii), as the South is completely
insulated from the North, apart from changing the range of validity of region (iii) itself.
Conversely, when the government of the South is not able to conne the circulation of
the unbranded good within its borders, e.g., due to an ine¤ective enforcement of IPRs,
unrestricted parallel trade implies that there is a rapidly declining investment in R&D,
and everybody loses. In the extreme when F tends to zero, both investment and coverage
(as well as consumer surplus and prots) go to zero with unrestricted parallel trade.
We conclude by commenting briey on the welfare analysis, when focused on the
impact of parallel trade. In region (ii), parallel trade further reduces investment com-
pared to its absence. Hence welfare goes down under parallel trade for intermediate costs
of compulsory licensing. In region (iii), the welfare properties of parallel trade depend
crucially on the enforcement of Paragraph 6. If the drug produced under compulsory
licensing is indeed conned to the South boundaries, parallel trade has no welfare im-
pact (apart from letting compulsory licensing arise for a wider range of values of F ). If
instead there is no such enforcement, and the good produced in the South can be traded
freely, parallel trade has extremely negative characteristics, and it shuts down innovation
completely in the limit when F is very low.
6 Summary and conclusions
Post TRIPs, governments across the developing world have tried to improve consumer
access to medicines sold by engaging in compulsory licensing. We have presented a for-
mal model of compulsory licensing, which is seen as a bargaining tool in the hands of
developing countries to improve access to essential drugs for those who need them. We
have shown that access depends largely on the South countrys capability to manufacture
a generic version in a relatively cheap way and on its ability to distribute it to the wider
16Precisely because in region (iii), under a restricted regime, the good produced under CL in the
South would not be reimported in the North, while in region (ii) the good produced by the monopolist
(and not under CL) would be lawfully subject to parallel trade, the monopolist has a stronger incentive
to let region (iii) emerge under parallel trade than without. This explains why eL > L:
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population. Of course, for the option to invoke compulsory licensing to matter, compul-
sory licensing need not actually be used: the threat to issue a compulsory license can
a¤ect the behavior of patent-holders to the advantage of developing countries, thereby
making its use unnecessary.
Our results are as follows. If the cost associated to a compulsory license is too high,
compulsory licensing is not a credible threat, and the monopolist supplies the drug to the
South in an unconstrained manner. As the cost goes down, compulsory licensing becomes
a credible threat and forces the manufacturer to reduce the prices, while still voluntarily
supplying the South. This could be the case of Brazil that managed to get better prices
for a number of branded drugs after threatening the manufacturing companies with
compulsory licensing. However, a lower price does not guarantee that the drug will
reach all those in need. The manufacturing company, being a prot maximizer, would
in fact cover less population as a response to the cheaper price of the drug.
When instead the cost of manufacturing for the South becomes very low, then com-
pulsory licensing emerges as an equilibrium feature of our model. Access to drugs reaches
its highest levels, as the South government aims to cover a wider population. Chaudhuri
et al. (2006), taking India as an example, suggest that drugs produced locally are easier
to reach Indian patients than those produced outside the country. This is what they call
the ease of access e¤ect, which seems to support the ndings of our model.
While a compulsory license improves access to essential drugs, pharmaceutical com-
panies believe that, if broadly used, compulsory licensing might undermine their incen-
tives for innovation. Indeed, this is what we nd. Nonetheless, the welfare e¤ects do
not necessarily go in the same direction. In fact, we have shown how welfare increases
globally in many circumstances, which should cast a much more positive light on com-
pulsory licensing. This result is the more interesting as, in our setting, we assumed
that compulsory licensing brings ine¢ciencies, such as duplications of costs. Also, we
conducted a long-run analysis that fully includes the impact on R&D investments, as
well as the inability to write contracts ex ante, i.e., before R&D costs are sunk. Even
when the South is relatively large, and thus has the largest negative impact on reducing
on global R&D, it is still better to supply a relatively lower quality drug to many more
people in the South under compulsory licensing, improving global welfare.
We have also shown that the capability of countries to enforce the rules of the IPR
system plays an important role both in access and innovation. We have found that if
policy makers are able to commit to the use of this non-voluntary license for the domestic
market only, the presence of parallel trade is irrelevant for the monopolists investments.
On the contrary, if under international exhaustion the policy makers have no capability
17
to enforce the IPR system, the use of compulsory licensing will completely backre and
reduce access and, what is more, it will be detrimental for the introduction of innovation,
yielding a rather large welfare loss.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. In region (i), if F is high, the outside option is ine¤ective,
thus we obtain the same result as in the unregulated benchmark case, that is, uCL = u,
which therefore is valid as long as Fk=(a42) > 3(u)2=32. The other limiting case is in
region (iii) when F is very low, so that the rm never sells in the South, then S = 0
and quality is u = uN < u. This candidate solution is valid as long as Fk=(a42) <
37(uN )2=512. The analysis is more involved in region (ii), valid for intermediate values
of F , the constraint identied by the threat of the government to use the outside option
binds, which is re-written as
CSS =
u2a42
8k
  F ) 4(au  pS)
3pS
2   u2(a42u2   8Fk) = 0: (11)
In the rst stage, the rm solves
d
du
=
@
@u
+
@
@pS
@pS
@u
= 0: (12)
By means of implicit di¤erentiation of (11), it is
@pS
@u
=
@ u
2a42
8k
@u  
@CSS
@u
@CSS
@pS
=
(au)4   2(au  pS)
2pS(au+ 2pS)
2u(au  pS)2(au  4pS)
: (13)
The numerator of (13) is always positive, as the expression 2(au   pS)
2pS(au + 2pS) is
single peaked in pS for pS < au, and even at the maximum can never exceed in absolute
value (au)4. The denominator is always negative as we are in a range of prices between
the unregulated benchmark and the preferred price for the South: au=4 < pS < au=2.
Thus @pS@u < 0, as an increase in u increases relatively more the value of the outside
option, and hence the price must be decreased in order to make the South accept the
o¤er. Since in (12) it is also @@pS = 0 for pS = p

S , and
@
@pS
> 0 for all pS < p

S ; we can
then conclude that quality starts at u when Fk=(a42) = 3(u)2=32, and then decreases
monotonically as F becomes smaller and pS < p

S : The solution is found by looking, in
the fpS ; ug space and within the admissible cone au=4 < pS < p

S , at the highest isoprot
curve of the monopolist satisfying the constraint (11). It is easy to prove that there is
always an interior solution strictly inside the cone. Although we omit the expressions
for space limitation, this result is obtained because the isoprot curves are vertical at
pS = p

S and then convex for lower prices, while instead the constraint is vertical at
pS = au=4 and then concave for higher prices; thus there is always a tangency point.
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We can also prove that the monopolist chooses this solution as long as it makes at least
the same amount as u
N
4   C(u
N ): In fact, as @@u

u=uN
< 0 for low enough pS , we can
show that it is optimal for the monopolist: a) to push the interior solution for values of
Fk=(a42) up to a limit value L strictly lower than 37(uN )2=512, where L is dened by
the isoprot curve  = u
N
4  C(u
N ) subject to (11), and b) it necessarily o¤ers a quality
below uN for values of Fk=(a42) approaching L from above.
Results on coverage follow easily by noting that in region (iii) it is xCL = uNa2=2k.
When instead we are in the intermediate region (ii), then from (4) it is xCL < x =
ua2=4k. As we have just established that, when Fx=(a42) approaches L from above,
u < uN , for sure coverage jumps up when Fx=(a42) is further reduced and CL is
exercised in region (iii) (with autarky it would be xN = 0). In fact, it may even be that
coverage in region (iii) is higher than in region (i) where it is xCL = ua2=4k. This
arises when uNa2=2k > ua2=4k, or u < 2uN , which depends on the convexity of the
cost function C(u) and on the value of k. The inequality is always satised when k is
large enough, as in the limit uN ! u: QED
Proof of Proposition 2. When C(u) = u
2
2 ; it is u
 = 4k
16k a42
,17 as well as
pN = u

2 ; p
S = au

2 and x
 = u
a2
4k : These can be substituted in (9) to obtain
W  =
k(32k   3a42)
2(16k   a42)2
:
In region (iii), it is uN = 14 ; and p
N = u
N
2 ; p
S = 0; xCL = u
Na2
2k : From (10) we
compute
WCL =
8k + a42
128k
  F:
When F ! 0 it is always WCL > W  for all admissible values of k=(a42) > 1=16. The
result is in fact stronger and extends to the entire region (iii). This is because, from
Proposition 1, in region (iii) it must be Fx=(a42) < L < 37(uN )2=512, and therefore F
is bounded above by 37(uN )2a42=(512k): Even at this higher threshold, it is immediate
to show that WCL > W  for all admissible values of k=(a42). QED
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us start with the restricted case, where goods pro-
duced in the South under CL cannot be reimported, whereas those supplied by the
monopolist can. If F is high, the outside option is ine¤ective, p = p is set everywhere,
thus we obtain the same result as without parallel trade (identical to the unregulated
17Recall that in order for the SOC to be satised, it must be k=(a42) > 1=16, hence u > 0:
23
benchmark case). If F is very low, the rm never sells in the South (which recurs to
CL) but can set pN = p
, so that S = 0 and N = u=4 and quality is again as in
the case without parallel trade. If F is intermediate, then N = pS(1   pS=u) and
S = p
2
S(u   pS)
2=2ku2. Like in the proof of the previous proposition, the solution is
found by looking at the highest isoprot curve (8) satisfying the constraint (11). The
constraint is the same, with and without parallel trade, and it is still characterized by
@pS=@u < 0. Since it is easy to prove that parallel trade reduces the marginal revenue,
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we thus obtain that the e¤ect of parallel trade is to reduce investment and increase the
price cap. Another di¤erence with the case without parallel trade is that, while the
monopolist still pushes this interior solution for values of Fk lower than 37(uNC)2=512,
now prots when both countries are supplied are strictly lower than without parallel
trade (they coincide only when pS = p
), thus the monopolist stops supplying the South
for values below eL, which is strictly higher than L; and again dened by the isoprot
curve  = uN=4  C(uN ) subject to (11).
We now turn our analysis to the case of unrestricted parallel trade. The good
manufactured in the South will be exported and traded everywhere, also under the
compulsory licensing regime (i.e., by means of the grey market). Cases (i) and (ii)
are unchanged and do not need to be analyzed again. The di¤erence is that now the
monopolist will never withdraw from the South, hence CL will never be used along the
equilibrium path. If it did so, then the price in the South would be zero but would apply
everywhere, and the monopolist will not invest at all. Therefore the validity of region
(ii) is now extended also for all values below eL: Investment approaches zero, as well as
prices and coverage, only as F ! 0. QED
18The di¤erence between marginal prots without and with parallel trade is
(u 2pS)(2p
3
S
 3p2
S
+u3)
4u(u pS)
2(u 4pS)
which
is positive for all u=4 < pS < p
:
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